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BETTER NOT CALL SAUL: THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL
ATTORNEYS ON THEIR CLIENTS’ SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Veronica J. Finkelstein

I. INTRODUCTION

The critically-acclaimed American crime drama television series
“Breaking Bad” is populated with memorable characters. Among
those characters is sleazy lawyer Saul Goodman, a character
introduced in the second season of the mega-hit series. Goodman is a
criminal attorney under any definition of the term. He is both a
lawyer who defends criminals, and a lawyer who, himself, is engaged
in the criminal activity of his clients.1 As the series unfolds,
Goodman is shown assisting his clients in drug conspiracies.
Specifically, Goodman launders the financial proceeds from his
clients’ methamphetamine distribution operation in an effort to
conceal their illegal activities.
Although Breaking Bad is fiction, there are real criminal lawyers
whose cases seem to have been taken from the pages of a Breaking
Bad script. Although the Supreme Court of the United States (the
Court or Supreme Court) has not yet granted certiorari to review a
case involving the Sixth Amendment implications of a criminal
lawyer, lower courts have been have convicted and sentenced
lawyers for behavior not unlike that of Goodman. For example, on
January 22, 2014, attorney R. Christopher Reade of Las Vegas pled
guilty to laundering approximately $2.25 million that his client
fraudulently obtained in an online investment scheme.2 In his plea
agreement, Reade admitted not only to laundering the money but to
making misrepresentations to regulators in an effort to conceal the
fraud. 3
Reade is far from the only lawyer accused of involvement in a
criminal conspiracy with a client. Prominent New Jersey criminal
 Ms. Finkelstein is an Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, Emory
University School of Law, and the Rutgers School of Law–Camden. This article constitutes her
personal work product and any opinions expressed herein are her personal opinion and not the opinion
of the United States Department of Justice.
1. For the remainder of this Article, the term “criminal attorney” refers to lawyers who are
involved in the criminal activities of its clients.
2. Jeff German, Las Vegas Lawyer Pleads Guilty in Money Laundering Scheme, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Jan. 23, 2014, at B003.
3. Id.
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defense lawyer Aaron Denker pled guilty to laundering money from
his clients’ drug sales.4 Denker was alleged to have accepted large
sums of illegally obtained funds from his clients. Denker then
converted those funds to money orders in smaller amounts, in an
effort to evade detection. Following his conviction, Denker was
disbarred from practicing in the State of New Jersey. 5
Boston criminal defense lawyer Robert A. George was sentenced
to three and a half years in prison for laundering $200,000 on behalf
of a former client.6 At the same time that he was appearing as a
defendant, George was serving as defense counsel to a client accused
of operating a gambling ring.7 Following his conviction, George
withdrew from representation.8 His sentence was subsequently
affirmed.9
Unfortunately, as these cases illustrate, the criminal attorney is no
mere fictional concept limited to a television series like Breaking
Bad. Although many attorneys would never dream of doing the acts
Reade, Denker, and George were convicted of doing, there are true
“criminal lawyers” in practice. Attorneys like Reade, Denker, and
George not only served as counsel to their clients, but these attorneys
either pled guilty to, or were found to have conspired in, their clients’
crimes.
This criminal behavior raises serious ethical implications,10 and
may violate the applicable rules of professional conduct.11
Importantly, the actions of a criminal attorney may violate a client’s
4. Larry Lewis, Lawyer Hit with Fine and Prison, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 6, 1996, at B03.
5. In re Denker, 147 N.J. 570, 570 (1997).
6. Brian Ballou, Lawyer is Given 3½ Years in Jail; George Stands by Innocence Claim, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 2012, at B4, B41; Tom Egan, Robert George’s Criminal Convictions Upheld,
MASS. LAW. WEEKLY, July 30, 2014.
7. Cape & Islands District Attorney DA O’Keefe Won’t be Charged in Federal Investigation,
MASS. LAW. WEEKLY, June 28, 2012.
8. Id.
9. U.S. v. George, 761 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2014).
10. See Beets v. Collins, 65 F.3d 1258, 1270 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Conflicts between a lawyer's selfinterest and his duty of loyalty to the client . . . fall along a wide spectrum of ethical sensitivity from
merely potential danger to outright criminal misdeeds.”); Cerro v. U.S., 872 F.2d 780, 788 (7th Cir.
1989) (“The purpose of the ethical duty to disclose potential conflicts is to ensure conflict-free
representation.”). Although the ethical issues are significant, they are not the focus of this article.
11. ABA Model Rule 1.7, the general rule regarding current conflicts of interest, states as
follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the
representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009).
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constitutional rights. In specific, when an attorney co-conspires with
his client and then defends that client at trial, the attorney’s conduct
raises issues that may implicate his client’s Sixth Amendment rights.
The Sixth Amendment provides various safeguards to criminal
defendants. Among those guarantees is that of a fair trial.12 This
guarantee has been deemed to include, with some limitations,
representation by competent and conflict-free counsel.13
Competency issues can take a variety of forms, from an attorney who
fails to call a key witness to testify,14 to an attorney accused of
sleeping through a cross examination.15
Conflict issues, in contrast, generally arise where an attorney
represents multiple clients, either concurrently or successively. The
most common situation that gives rise to a conflict of interest
concerns occurs when an attorney concurrently represents two
defendants who are both accused of a related crime. For example, if
two defendants are accused of conspiring to rob a bank, and one
attorney is appointed to represent both defendants at trial, the
representation would be considered concurrent joint representation.
When concurrent joint representation occurs, the attorney’s loyalty
may be unavoidably and impermissibly divided between his two
clients. For this reason, concurrent joint representation has been
scrutinized because a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
may be jeopardized.
The Sixth Amendment’s coverage, however, is not strictly limited
to circumstances of concurrent joint representation of co-defendants.
The Sixth Amendment also applies to other types of conflicts,
including those created when an attorney represents a client with
whom the attorney formerly himself conspired. As argued herein, an
attorney who is a participant in a criminal conspiracy will, by nature
of his own divided loyalties and interest in self-preservation, be
unable to provide effective representation to his client.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet recognized this type of
12. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1942); Avery
v. Ala., 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
14. Branch v. Sweeney, No. 13-1657, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13006, at *20–*23 (3d Cir. July 9,
2014).
15. Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2011).
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conflict as one requiring automatic reversal, such a rule is appropriate
for a myriad of reasons. Arguably, there can be no higher loyalty
than to one’s self. As this article posits, an attorney’s inherent desire
for self-preservation creates a conflict so serious that it justifies the
adoption of an automatic reversal rule. Indeed, at least one federal
circuit has regularly applied an automatic reversal rule to this type of
case.
The Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari to review a case
involving the Sixth Amendment implications of a criminal attorney
but such a case is likely to soon present itself. When that time
comes, the Supreme Court will have a unique opportunity to clarify,
expand, or curtail its ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.
A criminal attorney cannot provide effective assistance of counsel
because the attorney’s loyalties are irreparably divided. For the
reasons described herein, there are valid reasons for the Supreme
Court to impose an automatic reversal rule in cases where an attorney
represents a client co-conspirator in a trial relating to their joint
crime. To reach this conclusion, this Article will first explore the
scope and development of the Court’s ineffective assistance of
counsel jurisprudence. With that in mind, Part III of this Article will
assess the true nature of various types of conflicts. Part IV of this
Article explores the jurisprudence of the Second Circuit, which
employs an automatic reversal rule in circumstances of a coconspiring attorney. Finally, Part V of this Article argues that an
automatic reversal rule, like the rule utilized in the Second Circuit, is
justified in cases where an attorney represents a co-conspirator client.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
JURISPRUDENCE

The Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminal defendants a fair
trial.16 Beginning with Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included a
guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel.17 As part of this
guarantee, a defendant accused of a crime is entitled to the assistance
of counsel during key stages of the litigation.18 This right attaches in

16. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
17. Maureen R. Green, Comment: A Coherent Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1516, 151 (1983).
18. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 n.14 (1970). The appropriate focus of any Sixth Amendment analysis is on the integrity of the
adversarial system which includes the assistance of competent, conflict-free counsel. See Wheat v. U.S.,
486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
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all federal and state criminal prosecutions in which the defendant is
accused of a felony or certain serious misdemeanors.19
Although other substantive rights are also guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, the assistance of counsel has always been a key
constitutional protection.20 In a long line of cases culminating in
Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court recognized that assistance of
counsel is necessary to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial in
criminal cases.21 Because assistance of counsel is so fundamental to
ensuring the validity of the adversarial system, “defendants cannot be
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.”22 As the Court noted, the
assistance of counsel is not only a protection provided by the Sixth
Amendment, but absent this safeguard, “justice will not be done.”23
The right to counsel is fundamental for a variety of reasons. First,
the typical defendant is unfamiliar with the law, has no facility with
the rules of procedure, and is ill-prepared to rebut the charges leveled
against him by the prosecution.24 Without the assistance of counsel,
a defendant may be wrongfully convicted based on legal error or
faulty evidence.25
Second, the stakes are high. In a criminal case where the death
penalty or a lengthy incarceration looms as potential penalties, one
misstep in a defense can be the difference between life and death.26
Given the severity of the penalties, criminal cases are ones where
counsel’s assistance is particularly important.
Third, assistance of counsel is one method of guaranteeing a broad
spectrum of protections. A criminal defendant is entitled to various
protections under the constitution including, inter alia, the right to
confront witnesses, to trial by jury, and to be speedily tried. 27 The
defendant may not be aware of these and other rights. Even if he is

19. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1972) (affirming that the right applies to
serious misdemeanors); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (affirming that the right
applies to felonies).
20. See U.S. v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (noting the importance of defense counsel in
assuring the adversary criminal process is fair); U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (noting that the
assistance of trial counsel is a core purpose of the Sixth Amendment).
21. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339–40; see also Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269
(1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.
22. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
23. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462.
24. Mark W. Shiner, Conflicts of Interest Challenges Post Mickens v. Taylor: Redefining the
Defendant’s Burden in Concurrent, Successive, and Personal Interest Conflicts, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 965, 969 (2003).
25. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463 (discussing the risks inherent in the deprival of assistance of
counsel)
26. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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aware, the lay defendant may not understand how to assert these
rights. It is through counsel that the defendant’s other substantive
constitutional rights are protected.28
Finally, the right to counsel ensures the trial not only is fair but
appears fair to the outside world. In many ways, public perception is
paramount to the functioning of the justice system. Ensuring that all
defendants have appropriate access to effective counsel bolsters the
validity of the adversarial system itself.29
For these and other reasons, apart from a few narrow exceptions,
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is absolute.30 Counsel is so
fundamental, that it is guaranteed regardless of the defendant’s
economic status. For this reason, counsel must be appointed in
criminal cases to represent defendants who would otherwise be
unable to pay.31 Where a defendant is entitled to counsel at trial, if
that counsel is absent, the defendant’s conviction is generally subject
to automatic reversal.32
Simply being in the courtroom during trial, however, is
insufficient. An attorney defending a client in a criminal case has a
significant obligation. Counsel must be more than a potted plant; his
mere presence does not constitute the constitutionally guaranteed
level of assistance.33 To meet the requirements of Gideon, counsel
must also be effective.34 Among other requirements, counsel must
act in a manner that is objectively reasonable and that does not
detrimentally prejudice the outcome of the case.35 If present counsel
does not fulfil this role properly, the defendant’s conviction may
subsequently be reversed.36 As the Court has noted, however,
surmounting the high bar to prove ineffective assistance is not an

28. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 179 n.1 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Of all the
rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for
it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.”)
29. Hadassah Reimer, Legal Ethics: Stabbed in the back, but no adverse effect, Mickens v.
Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), 3 WYO. L. REV. 329, 332 (2003).
30. Jeffrey Scott Glassman, Note: Mickens v. Taylor: The Court’s New Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
Policy for Attorneys Faced with a Conflict of Interest, 18 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 919, 923–24 (Summer,
2004); Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 42 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 525, 567 (2013)
(noting that waiver must be knowing and intelligent); see also Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)
(noting that even waiver by the defendant must be viewed with scrutiny due to the integral nature of
assistance of counsel to the adversarial system).
31. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
32. Id. at 339.
33. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
34. Id. at 686; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); Avery v. Ala., 308 U.S. 444, 446
(1940).
35. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476-77 (U.S. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
36. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
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easy task.37 The attorney need only act “within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”38
When evaluating whether counsel was effective, and therefore
ensured due process protections to the defendant, the focus is the
integrity of the adversarial system.39 Where that integrity has been
detrimentally impacted, the defendant’s constitutional rights may
have been violated.
When a defendant was represented by an attorney who failed to
provide effective assistance, the defendant may be entitled to postconviction relief if his constitutional rights have been violated.40 A
claim for post-conviction relief is a powerful claim; if the defendant
is successful he may be entitled to a new trial. For this reason, as one
commentator has noted, ineffective assistance claims are some of the
most frequently raised claims in both state and federal postconviction petitions.41
The Court has not considered a conflict case where the conflict
arose from a criminal attorney representing his co-conspirator client.
The Court has addressed ineffective assistance claims in two primary
contexts: conflicts of interest and attorney performance.42 The Court
first set the parameters for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
Glasser v. United States. The Court further honed its rules through a
line of conflict of interest cases, including Holloway v. Arkansas,
Cuyler v. Sullivan, and Wood v. Georgia. The Court articulated a
different rule in its attorney performance cases, including the notable
decisions in Strickland v. Washington and United States v. Cronic. In
Mickens v. Taylor the Court’s most recent decision addressing the
conflict of interest inherent in successive representation, the Court
attempted to reconcile its prior cases. To date, Mickens remains the
Court’s final word on ineffective assistance claims in the context of
conflicts of interest.

37. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
38. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
39. Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
40. Anne Bowen Poulin, Conflicts Of Interest In Criminal Cases: Should The Prosecution Have
A Duty To Disclose?, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1135, 1137 (2010).
41. Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective Assistance of Trial
Counsel Claims in State and Federal Postconviction Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST. 6, 6 (2009).
42. Other contexts include conflicts between the attorney and the judge, an employer and
employee, or between multiple attorneys representing discrete interests. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483
U.S. 776 (U.S. 1987) (two attorneys from the same firm representing co-defendant); Wood v. Georgia,
450 U.S. 261 (1981) (counsel was retained and paid by the employer on behalf of defendant employees);
U.S. v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (counsel feared reprisal from the judge due to actions
taken to defend his client).
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A. The Court set the parameters for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in Glasser v. United States.

The Court first addressed the parameters of a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel in the landmark case of Glasser v. United
States.43 In Glasser, the trial court appointed defendant Glasser’s
attorney to represent Glasser’s co-conspirator, defendant Kretske,
notwithstanding Glasser’s objection to the joint representation.44 At
trial, the attorney zealously advocated for Kretske while foregoing
trial strategies that would have been detrimental to Kretske and
beneficial to Glasser.45 In specific, the attorney failed to crossexamine a witness whose testimony was used to link Glasser to the
conspiracy.46 The attorney also failed to object to arguably
inadmissible evidence.47 Glasser, Kretske, and other co-conspirators
were all convicted.48
On review, the Court found that the trial court’s failure to provide
Glasser with the assistance of an “undivided” attorney violated
Glasser’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.49
The Glasser court declined to apply the harmless error standard,
adopting a standard more lenient to defendants.
Instead the Glasser Court merely required that the concurrent joint
representation had prejudiced Glasser. Although the Court noted that
“nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice” were unnecessary in
light of the fundamental deprivation of constitutional rights, the
Court nonetheless engaged in a factual analysis to find some
evidence of actual prejudice.50 The Court noted, inter alia, that the
attorney’s representation of Glasser “was not as effective as it might
have been” but for the conflict posed by the concurrent joint
representation.51 The Court ultimately set aside the verdict below
and granted Glasser a new trial.52
In Glasser, the Court had an opportunity to announce a bright-line
rule and to declare unconstitutional an attorney’s concurrently
representation of co-defendants. The Court elected not to do so.
Instead, the Court permitted concurrent joint representation.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

315 U.S. 60 (1942).
Id. at 68–69.
Id.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id.
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The Court not only permitted concurrent joint representation to
occur, but suggested that this type of representation might be a valid
strategic choice by the defendant. As noted in Justice Frankfurter’s
dissent in Glasser, “[j]oint representation is a means of insuring
against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives
strength against a common attack.”53 The Glasser Court also
determined that judicial economy weighed in favor of permitting, at
least in some circumstances, concurrent joint representation.
Inherent in the Glasser decision was the Court’s presumption that
serving two masters does not create an automatic, unavoidable
division of loyalties. By declining to prohibit all concurrent joint
representation, the Court recognized that, in some cases, an attorney
serving two masters may have divided loyalties but, in other cases,
there may be no division of loyalties. This presumption manifests
itself in the Court’s future conflict jurisprudence, as is further
discussed herein. Had the Glasser Court announced a bright-line
rule, the problem posed by a criminal attorney may have never
manifested. Nor would prejudice have been injected into the
analysis. Instead, the Glasser Court held that only certain divided
loyalties, those resulting in prejudice, rose to the level of ineffective
assistance at trial.
In addition to declining to adopt a bright-line rule, the Glasser
Court failed to announce a specific test to measure prejudice. The
Glasser Court also declined to determine the specific amount of
prejudice necessary for reversal. After the Glasser decision, it
appeared that a showing of some amount of prejudice was necessary
for a defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim. How
much prejudice or how such prejudice should be proven was unclear.
Following Glasser, the lower courts varied in their approaches to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Lower courts primarily
diverged as to the specific amount of prejudice a defendant had to
show to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim. Some courts held
that the mere potential for prejudice was sufficient to constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.54
Other courts applied the
reasonable doubt standard, evaluating the record for evidence of a
conscious, knowing decision by all defendants to enter into joint
representation.55 Yet other courts required a showing of actual
prejudice.56 Still others applied different standards depending on
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., Lollar v. U.S., 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
See, e.g., U.S. v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1970); Lott v. U.S., 218 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.

1955).
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when the ineffective assistance claim was raised.57 For example, in
Washington state courts, if the claim was raised at the time counsel
was appointed, the defendant only needed to articulate the possibility
of prejudice.58 If the claim was raised post-trial, actual prejudice
needed to be shown from the trial court record.59 In the years after
Glasser was decided, there was little consistency among lower courts
evaluating ineffective assistance claims in the context of concurrent
joint representation.
B. The Court further honed its rules through a line of conflict of
interest cases, including Holloway v. Arkansas, Cuyler v.
Sullivan, and Wood v. Georgia.

Between 1978 and 1981, the Court considered three major conflict
of interest cases, which extended the reasoning set forth in Glasser.
First, in Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court adopted an automatic
reversal rule for timely raised concurrent joint representation
conflicts. Second, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court articulated a
different, two-part “actual conflict” test for untimely raised
challenges. Third, in Wood v. Georgia, the Court extended the
Holloway automatic reversal rule to cases where the trial court had a
duty to inquire into a conflict even in the absence of a timely
challenge. These three major cases served as the basis for years of
litigation relating to concurrent joint representation conflicts.
1. In Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court adopted an automatic
reversal rule for timely raised concurrent joint representation
conflicts.

The Court further refined the parameters of a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel in a case of concurrent joint representation in
Holloway v. Arkansas. In Holloway, the trial court appointed a single
public defender to represent three defendants who were each charged
with rape.60 Prior to trial, the attorney moved for the appointment of
separate counsel for each defendant.61 In support of his motion, he
described the potential for prejudice, noting that due to the
concurrent joint representation he could learn confidential
information from one defendant that would create a conflict of
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 508 P.2d 1386 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
Id. at 1389.
Id.
435 U.S. 475, 476–77 (1980).
Id. at 477.
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interest in terms of his representation of another defendant.62 The
attorney argued that the defendants themselves had articulated to him
the possibility of a conflict of interest. 63
Notwithstanding this argument, the motion was denied and the trial
court required the attorney to represent all three defendants. 64 Prior
to jury selection and again before presenting the defense case in
chief, the attorney requested a severance.65 The trial court denied
each request.66 The defendants were convicted.67
On review, the Holloway Court held that the trial court’s failure to
inquire into the potential conflict and appoint separate counsel not
only amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, but that such a
failure mandated automatic reversal.68 The Holloway Court noted
that, “the mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the
Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate’s conflicting
obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters.”69
The Holloway Court attempted to create consistency in ineffective
assistance of counsel claims going forward. Citing the Glasser
decision, the Holloway opinion noted the divergent approaches
among lower courts faced with ineffective assistance claims.70 The
Holloway Court read the Glasser decision “as holding that whenever
a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely
objection[,] reversal is automatic.”71
The Holloway Court, however, declined to rule on the standard
applicable to all attorney conflict claims, deciding only the standard
applicable when the challenge to concurrent joint representation was
made by counsel before trial.72 The Holloway Court did not decide
that its automatic reversal rule would apply where the conflict was
never raised before the trial court. Nor did it consider any
applications arising from a criminal attorney.
Importantly, the Holloway Court decided that, at least for
objections raised before trial, no specific amount of prejudice need be
proven. In fact, the Holloway Court determined that, at least in some
cases, no prejudice need be proven at all. Instead, the Holloway
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 467–77.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 483–84.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 484.
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Court held that reversal is automatic wherever a trial court compels
concurrent joint representation over a timely, pre-trial objection by
the attorney.73 In essence, the Holloway Court determined that
certain types of conflicts create a per se violation of the Sixth
Amendment. One category of those types of conflicts were cases like
Holloway, where counsel affirmatively raises the conflict and the trial
court declines to inquire into the matter.
In its reasoning, the Holloway Court noted the difficulty
encountered by a defendant who is faced with having to prove actual
prejudice to be entitled to post-conviction relief.74 As the Holloway
Court noted, the inherent danger in a conflict of interest situation is
not what the attorney does, which can be shown from the record, but
rather what the attorney refrains from doing as a result of his divided
loyalties.75 On the record, there is no way to know what options,
tactics, and decisions were considered and rejected due to the
conflict.76 In recognition of the impossibility of proving prejudice
post hoc, the Holloway Court simply obviated any need for such a
showing, at least where an objection to the concurrent joint
representation was timely raised pre-trial.
Instead, the Holloway Court held that where the objection was
timely raised, the conflict requires automatic reversal, without a
showing of prejudice or an adverse effect. The mere possibility of
conflict, however remote, is sufficient and no prejudice need be
proven. Since the Holloway decision was issued, the Court has
consistently held that a trial court has a duty to ascertain if there is a
conflict in two situations: first, when the issue is timely raised by a
litigant; or second, where the potential for conflict is readily
apparently to the trial court based on the record at trial.77 In either of
these two situations, if the trial court fails to ascertain the effect of
the conflict, reversal is automatic without any need for the defendant
to prove prejudice from the trial court record.
In its Holloway decision, the Court carefully limited its holding to
the facts of Holloway—namely a concurrent joint representation
conflict raised before trial. By reserving for another day the issue of
untimely objections to concurrent joint representation, the Holloway
Court tacitly endorsed the Glasser reasoning that serving two masters
sometimes creates an unavoidable, automatic division of loyalties but
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
(1981).

Id. at 488–89.
Id. at 490–91.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 496.
Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1988); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272–73
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that, at other times, creates an potential for conflict that never ripens
into an actual conflict.
At its essence, the Holloway Court focused more directly on the
obligations of the trial court to evaluate matters presented to it than
the actual nature of a conflict of interest. By focusing on the trial
court’s failure, the Holloway Court sidestepped an opportunity to
consider whether all concurrent joint representation conflicts might
give rise to an automatic right to reversal. By limiting its decision to
only timely, pre-trial objections, the Holloway Court reserved
judgment as to the question of how much prejudice needed be shown
to prove actual divided loyalties under other circumstances.
2. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court articulated a different, two-part
“actual conflict” test for untimely raised challenges.

In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court was presented with the issue it had
declined to rule upon in Holloway, namely the necessary strength of
any showing of an actual conflict of interest where an objection is
first raised post-trial. The Sullivan Court drew a clear, bright line
between timely and untimely challenges to concurrent joint
representation. The Sullivan Court left intact its Holloway decision.
As a result, where a challenge is lodged pre-trial, reversal is
automatic with no showing of prejudice required. In contrast, the
Sullivan Court held that where a challenge is lodged post-trial, the
defendant must show actual prejudice.
In Sullivan, a pair of privately-hired attorneys represented three codefendants who were all accused of murder.78 Neither the codefendants nor their attorneys objected to this representation at trial.79
The first defendant to be tried was Sullivan.80 The evidence
against Sullivan was largely circumstantial.81 Sullivan himself never
testified and the defense chose not to present a case.82 Sullivan was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison. 83 The other two defendants
were each separately tried and acquitted.84 Sullivan appealed his
conviction, which was affirmed.85
Defendant Sullivan raised an objection to the concurrent joint

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

446 U.S. 335, 337 (1980).
Id. at 337–38.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 338–40.
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representation only after he was convicted and his co-defendants
were acquitted.86 During this phase of litigation the two trial
attorneys gave conflicting accounts of their roles at the trial.87 At
least according to certain testimony, one attorney jointly represented
multiple defendants.88
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
granted Sullivan a reversal of his conviction.89 Citing Holloway and
other cases from within the circuit, the Third Circuit held that “actual
prejudice or conflict of interest need not be shown” because even a
remote possibility is sufficient.90 Without guidance to the contrary
from the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit simply applied the
Holloway rule without considering whether this rule was applicable
in light of the untimely challenge to the concurrent joint
representation by Sullivan.
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Third
Circuit applied the wrong standard. As an initial matter, the Sullivan
Court distinguished Holloway, reasoning that:
Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate timely
objections to multiple representation. But nothing in our
precedents suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires state
courts themselves to initiate inquiries into the propriety of
multiple representation in every case. Defense counsel have an
ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to
advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises
during the course of trial. Absent special circumstances,
therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple
representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his
clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.91
In so reasoning, the Sullivan Court declined to hold that the
Court’s Holloway automatic reversal rule was applicable under the
facts presented in the Sullivan case.
The Sullivan Court instead articulated a new, two-part test. Under
this test, the defendant had the burden to show that the conflict
adversely affected one or more actions taken by the attorney at trial.92
The Sullivan Court concluded that where no timely objection is
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340.
U.S. ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 519–20 (3d Cir. 1979).
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346–47.
See id. at 348–50.
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raised, a defendant must show: first, that there was an actual conflict
of interest; and second, that this conflict adversely affected the
attorney’s performance.93
The Sullivan Court provided scant explanation of this new test. In
their concurring opinions, Justices Brennan and Marshall attempted
to further delineate the test’s parameters. Citing ethics rules, Justice
Marshall defined an actual conflict as one that created a divergence
between the attorney and client regarding “a material factual or legal
issue or to a course of action.”94 As to the second prong of the test,
less guidance was provided. Noting that something more than a mere
potential for divergence between the attorney and client was
necessary, the concurring Justices concluded that the defendant must
prove that the attorney “actively represented” competing interests.95
Although the test was imprecisely defined by the majority
decision, one thing was made apparent by the Sullivan Court—where
a challenge to joint representation is untimely raised, some amount of
prejudice, in the form of an “adverse effect” must be shown.
Reversal is not automatic in this context. The Sullivan Court held
that if a defendant shows that his attorney actively represented
conflicting interests and that the conflict had an adverse effect on the
attorney’s performance, reversal is warranted. The Sullivan Court
distinguished this standard from the one the Court articulated in
Glasser, and failed to explain the substantive difference between the
two standards.96
In so holding, the Sullivan Court, at least in part, resolved the
divergence in the circuits created by its Glasser decision. Where
prejudice need be shown, all that needed to be proven was an
“adverse effect” relating to a material issue. In this way, although
departing from its automatic reversal rule in Holloway, the Sullivan
Court nonetheless set what appeared to be a low bar for defendants
challenging concurrent joint representation. The Sullivan test
became known as the “actual conflict” test. To meet this test, a
defendant must prove some actual impact caused by the conflict,
albeit perhaps less impact than a different verdict at trial.
By articulating the “actual conflict” test without overruling the
Holloway automatic reversal rule, the Sullivan Court created a brightline distinction between timely and untimely challenges to concurrent
joint representation. In so holding, the Court tacitly endorsed the
93. Id. at 348.
94. Id. at 356 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 351 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 72–75 (1942)).
96. See id. at 348–50.
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concept that some conflicts are so severe as to unavoidably taint
representation, whereas other conflicts are less severe.
The
distinction between the Holloway rule and Sullivan test has no
specific grounding in the due process clause itself, but arose instead
from the Court’s apparent belief that different types of conflicts and
challenges to representation require different treatment. In cases of
an untimely challenge, a showing of some minimal prejudice is
required. The required showing is less burdensome than in other
types of assistance of counsel cases, but more than in the case of a
timely-raised objection under Holloway.97 In cases where an
objection was timely raised no prejudice need be shown. Reversal in
such a case is automatic. The distinction based on the timing of the
challenge was one created by the Court, not one evident in the Sixth
Amendment itself.
The Court may have also had practical concerns at heart. The
Sullivan test created a scheme in which new trials were far less likely
to be granted than under Holloway, decreasing the chances that a trial
verdict would later be disturbed by a Sixth Amendment challenge.
The Sullivan Court made clear to trial courts that the power to
prevent constitutional challenges to verdicts was, in large part, in the
hands of the trial court itself. If a challenge was raised, the trial court
had an obligation to act. If the challenge was untimely raised, the
obligation was on the defendant to make more of a showing to justify
reversal. Unfortunately for litigants, however, the Sullivan Court
made it far more difficult for a conviction to be overturned if counsel
failed to timely challenge a representational conflict.
The Court also endorsed reasoning that seemingly rendered it quite
easy for a defendant to prove an entitlement to reversal. In the case
of a timely challenge, the mere challenge was sufficient. In the case
of an untimely challenge, reversal was not automatic but it required
some showing of actual prejudice. By adopting the Sullivan test
without overruling Holloway, the Court implied a continued belief
that conflicts of interest pose serious threats to the right to assistance
of counsel. The Sullivan Court established different standards for
different types of conflict challenges.

97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984) (comparing the higher burden for
attorney performance cases to the lower burden articulated in Sullivan).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/4

16

Finkelstein: Better Not Call Saul: The Impact of Criminal Attorneys on their

2015]

BETTER NOT CALL SAUL

1231

3. In Wood v. Georgia, the Court extended the Holloway automatic
reversal rule to cases where the trial court had a duty to inquire
into a conflict.

Less than a year after Sullivan was decided, the Court decided
Wood v. Georgia.98 The defendants in Wood were employees of an
adult theater and bookstore who were changed with distributing
obscene materials.99 Due to the defendants’ employment relationship
with the adult bookstore, the bookstore agreed to retain an attorney
for the defendants and to pay the attorney’s fees and any fines.100
There was no evidence to suggest that the defendants objected to this
arrangement.101
As agreed, the bookstore arranged for an attorney.102 The
defendants were convicted and sentenced.103 The attorney did not
argue in favor of a reduced sentence.104 Instead, he lodged an
unsuccessful constitutional attack.105 As part of their sentence, each
defendant was issued a fine.106 The fines were within the bookstore’s
ability to pay, but exceeded the defendants’ ability to pay.107
The bookstore then reneged on the agreement to pay the fines.108
The defendants did not themselves pay, arguing that they were
unable to pay.109 This set of circumstances created a situation
wherein the institution of fines could be challenged on the basis of
the equal protection clause.110 To some observers, it appeared that
the bookstore and attorney were primarily interested in creating a
“test case” to litigate constitutional issues of importance to the
bookstore.111 Actual defense of the defendants seemed secondary, if
a factor at all.
The Wood case was truly novel in several ways. Unlike Holloway
and Sullivan, the conflict in Wood was not caused by concurrent joint
representation, at least not entirely. Instead, the conflict was between
the defendant and a third-party paying the defendant’s legal fees.
98. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
99. Id. at 263.
100. Id. at 266.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 267.
103. Id. at 263.
104. Id. at 272.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 263.
107. Id. at 264.
108. Id. at 267.
109. Id. at 264.
110. Id. at 266–67.
111. Id. at 267.
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This conflict manifested in the attorney, who was torn between the
defendants and the bookstore.
In addition, the facts of Wood presented a scenario somewhere on
the spectrum between the facts of Holloway and Sullivan in terms of
the timeliness of the disclosure of conflict. Unlike in Holloway, there
was no timely pre-trial objection to the representation. Unlike in
Sullivan, however, there was a sufficient record before the trial court
to heavily suggest a conflict. The attorney’s entire course of
conduct—his very litigation strategy—suggested that he was serving
a master other than the defendants.
On review, the Wood Court held that the trial court knew or should
have known about the attorney’s conflict of interest due to the
attorney’s disclosures and conduct during trial.112 This holding
signaled an apparent change from the reasoning in Sullivan. Indeed,
the Wood Court focused on the fact that, during the trial, the
prosecution noted that a conflict of interest might be created due to
counsel’s fee arrangement.113 Finding the facts more akin to
Holloway than Sullivan, the Wood Court reasoned that trial court
knew or should have known about the potential conflict of interest.114
Because the trial court failed to inquire, the Wood Court held that the
appropriate remedy was reversal, and granted new proceedings
“untainted . . . by conflicting interests.” 115
The Wood Court
extended the Holloway automatic reversal rule beyond the context of
timely pre-trial challenges to cases where the trial court had a duty to
inquire.
In many ways, the Wood decision reinforced the rules articulated
in Holloway and Sullivan. In deciding Wood, the Court left the
Sullivan test intact but created a new category of cases where the
Holloway automatic reversal rule applied—cases where a conflict
should have been apparent to the trial court. Although no timely
objection to the representation was made in Wood, the conflict was
patent to the trial court. By contrast, in Sullivan, no unusual
circumstances would have made the trial court aware of the conflict.
In its Wood decision, the Court expanded the application of the
Holloway rule to cases of timely objection or where the trial court
had a duty to inquire into conflict. The Sullivan rule, in contrast,
applied to untimely objections and cases where the trial court had no
reason to inquire.
The Wood case was the first conflict case decided by the Court
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 273, n.20.
Id. at 273–74.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/4

18

Finkelstein: Better Not Call Saul: The Impact of Criminal Attorneys on their

2015]

BETTER NOT CALL SAUL

1233

where the conflict was not one of concurrent joint representation.
The conflict, instead, was one between the competing interests of an
employer and employees.116 By aligning the facts of Wood with
those of Holloway, the Court seemingly acknowledged that conflicts
other than those of concurrent joint representation can be serious
enough to warrant automatic reversal. The Wood decision reinforced
the extent to which the Court acknowledged that attorney conflicts
can irreparably taint a defendant’s case.
C. The Court articulated a different rule in its attorney
performance cases, including the notable decisions in Strickland
v. Washington and United States v. Cronic.

After Glasser, with the exception of Holloway, Sullivan, and
Wood, the Court primarily considered ineffective assistance claims
arising from circumstances other than joint representation. These
cases involved ineffective assistance caused not by attorney conflicts
of interests but instead by attorney performance. In Chambers v.
Maroney, for example, the Court considered whether an attorney was
ineffective due to the fact that the attorney met his client on the way
to the courthouse on the eve of trial, leaving no time for advance
preparation.117 In Estelle v. Williams, an ineffective assistance claim
was grounded in the attorney’s failure to object to an order requiring
the defendant to wear prison garb during trial.118 Ineffective
assistance claims were raised relating to the attorney’s professional
qualifications,119
health,120
pre-trial
performance,121
trial
116. There was also concurrent joint representation in Wood, although the conflict concerning the
Wood Court was not this conflict but rather the conflict created by the employer’s retention of counsel
for the defendants.
117. 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970).
118. 425 U.S. 501, 502 (1976).
119. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1151, 1159–60 (10th Cir. 2010) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine the attorney’s competency and for a new
trial if the attorney was deemed incompetent where the attorney was unlicensed at the time of trial); U.S.
v. Watson, 479 F.3d 607, 610–12 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial where
his trial counsel’s license was suspended during trial); Young v. Runnels, 435 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.
2006) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a new trial where trial counsel was subsequently disbarred);
U.S. v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 886–87, 891 (2d Cir. 1990) (reversing the trial court’s denial of the
defendant’s petition for vacation of the judgment of conviction where trial counsel had fraudulently
obtained admission to the New York State Bar).
120. See, e.g., Ivory v. Jackson, 509 F.3d 284, 294–95, 298 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the trial
court’s denial of a new trial where the defendant alleged that his trial counsel used drugs and alcohol
during trial); U.S. v. Eyman, 313 F.3d 741, 742–44, 745 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming the defendant’s
conviction and sentence where trial counsel failed to call an expert witness to testify); Frye v. Lee, 235
F.3d 897, 907–08 (4th Cir. 2000) (dismissing an appeal where the trial attorney consumed alcohol but
not to the extent that it impacted his performance at trial); Johnson v. Norris, 207 F.3d 515, 518, 521
(8th Cir. 2000) (affirming a judgment where trial counsel was bipolar); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480,
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performance,122 and post-trial performance.123
A separate line of authority from Glasser developed specifically to
address ineffective assistance claims relating to attorney
performance. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court articulated a
“but for” causation test that applies in the case of deficient attorney
performance. In United States v. Cronic, the Court concluded that
certain performance could be so deficient as to require automatic
reversal. In important ways, these decisions reinforced many of the
Court’s implicit assumptions that underpin the Court’s conflict of
interest jurisprudence. Although reinforcing many of its prior
assumptions, the Court developed an entirely different standard for
attorney performance cases than it had applied to the conflict
situations in Holloway and Sullivan.
1. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court articulated a “but for”
causation test that applies in the case of deficient attorney
performance.

The attorney performance standard was first articulated by the
Court in Strickland v. Washington.124 In Strickland, the Court
considered whether there had been ineffective assistance based on an
attorney’s tactical decision not to pursue certain litigation

485–86, 488 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying habeas corpus relief where trial counsel was subsequently
diagnosed with advanced Alzheimer’s disease).
121. See, e.g., Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 121–22, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming the trial
court’s guilt-phase determinations, but vacating the trial court’s order for sentencing relief and
remanding for an evidentiary hearing concerning the impact, if any, of the attorney’s failure to
investigate mitigating evidence); Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 613–14 (5th Cir. 2006) (reversing
judgment against the defendant and ordering that he be re-tried or released where trial counsel failed to
strike jurors who admitted they could not be fair and impartial); James v. Harrison, 389 F.3d 450, 456–
57 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming the trial court’s judgment denying a new trial where the defendant’s
attorney was absent during voir dire and jury selection because he relied on the attorneys representing
co-defendants); Mello v. Dipaulo, 295 F.3d 137, 145–47, 151 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying habeas corpus
relief where trial counsel failed to investigate the use of expert testimony); Hughes v. U.S., 258 F.3d
453, 462–64 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing and remanding for a new trial where the defendant’s attorney
failed to challenge a venireperson who admitted bias).
122. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 688, 701–02 (2002) (reversing and remanding where
trial counsel made a strategic choice not to deliver a closing argument); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 385, 391 (1986) (affirming the circuit court’s determination that the defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed to timely challenge key evidence against the
defendant).
123. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534–38 (2003) (reversing and remanding for a
new sentencing hearing where trial counsel failed to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing
phase); Glover v. U.S., 531 U.S. 198, 203–05 (2001) (reversing and remanding for a new sentencing
hearing where trial counsel failed to object to the defendant’s convictions being combined, which
increased the defendant’s overall sentence).
124. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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strategies.125 In Strickland, against the advice of his court-appointed
trial attorney, defendant Washington waived his right to a jury at
sentencing and pled guilty to capital murder.126 In an effort to
prevent damaging evidence from being admitted during the
sentencing phase, Washington’s attorney did not prepare a
presentence report and did not call Washington or any other
witnesses to testify during the sentencing hearing.127 In the absence
of scant mitigating evidence, Washington was sentenced to death. 128
Washington subsequently challenged his conviction on the basis that
his attorney was ineffective for failing to undertake additional
investigation to determine whether a psychiatric defense might have
been viable and effective.129
On review, the Strickland Court distinguished ineffectiveness
claims alleging deficient attorney performance from those alleging a
conflict of interest. In the case of attorney performance, the
Strickland Court held that prejudice needed be proven to a degree
more significant than it had required in Sullivan. The Strickland
Court characterized the Sullivan test as a “not quite per se rule of
prejudice.”130 Although the Sullivan test required that the defendant
show only an actual conflict and adverse effect, the Strickland test
required that the defendant show actual prejudice. In essence, under
the Strickland test the defendant must show that “but for [his
attorney’s actions], the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”131 This standard is considerably higher than the standard
in Sullivan. Under the Sullivan test, the defendant need show only
some prejudicial effect, not an entirely different outcome.
In addition, the Strickland Court ruled out the application of the
Holloway automatic reversal rule to attorney performance cases. The
Strickland Court, citing Sullivan, concluded that prejudice may only
be presumed in conflict of interest cases.132 In attorney performance
cases, the Court could not generally begin with the presumption of
ineffective assistance, as it was entitled to do in conflict cases that fit
the facts of Holloway and Wood.
In its Strickland decision, the Court articulated a very different
presumption in an attorney performance case as compared to conflict

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 673.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 678–79.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 692.
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cases. In so doing, the Court distinguished conflicts of interest from
virtually all other issues giving rise to ineffective assistance
claims.133 In conflict cases, at least those like Holloway and Wood,
the conflicted representation created a presumption of ineffective
assistance as the starting point of the Court’s analysis.
In cases of attorney performance, on the other hand, the Court
announced a starting presumption that the attorney’s performance
was adequate.134
In Strickland, the Court articulated this
presumption as a belief that the attorney’s strategy and tactics fell
“within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” unless
the defendant is able to show deviation from the general standards of
attorney practice.135 Moreover, the defendant has the added burden
of proving that for the attorney’s deficient performance, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.136 In specific, the
Strickland Court held that a claim for ineffective assistance due to
attorney performance had two elements:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.137
Applying this new test to the facts before it, the Strickland Court held
that Washington had not met his burden to show causation and was
not entitled to reversal under the Sixth Amendment.138
The Strickland test sets a high bar for defendants. Although
ineffective claims have been sustained where an attorney’s
performance was so deficient that it was as though he was absent
through major phases of trial,139 defendants frequently fail to make
the necessary but for showing of prejudice.140 Under the Strickland
133. Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive Caseloads as
Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 438 (2012).
134. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
135. Id. See also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam).
136. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; see also Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling The Sixth Amendment,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 542–43 (2009).
137. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
138. Id. at 698–701.
139. See, c.f., U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
140. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (no ineffective assistance claim proven
where counsel failed to object based on later overruled case law); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989)
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standard, the defendant must show more than mere prejudice. The
defendant must show prejudice that has more than “some conceivable
effect on the outcome”—the prejudice must have “more likely than
not altered the outcome.”141
In sum, the Strickland test, which is applied to most ineffective
assistance claims, contains a much higher standard than the standard
articulated in Holloway and Sullivan. In so holding, the Court
indicated its belief that conflicts generally pose a more serious risk to
a defendant than even the most bumbling attorney performance.
2. In United States v. Cronic, the Court concluded that some
attorney performance could be so deficient as to require
automatic reversal.

On the same day the Court decided Strickland, it also decided a
second ineffective assistance case with starkly different facts and
ultimate outcome. In United States v. Cronic, the Court delineated
certain circumstances in which an automatic reversal rule would
apply to attorney performance cases.142 Defendant Cronic and two
other defendants were indicted on mail fraud charges relating to a
scheme involving an alleged shell corporation.143 At trial, Cronic’s
inexperienced and newly-appointed attorney presented no defense.144
Instead, the attorney cross-examined the government’s witnesses in
an effort to establish both that the corporation was not a shell and that
defendant Cronic did not control the corporation.145 Cronic was
nonetheless convicted.146
The Cronic Court began its analysis by acknowledging that a
complete denial of counsel would violate the Sixth Amendment.147
The Cronic Court then noted that there are certain circumstances
where “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one,
could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of
prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the
(no ineffective assistance claim proven where the defendant was preventing from talking with his
attorney during parts of the trial); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 795–96 (1987) (no ineffective
assistance claim proven where the defendant claimed his counsel failed to investigate potentially
mitigating evidence); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (no ineffective assistance claim proven
where the defendant claimed his counsel refused to present certain testimony at trial).
141. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94.
142. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–62.
143. Id. at 649–51.
144. Id. at 649, 651.
145. Id. at 651.
146. Id. at 650.
147. Id. at 659.
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trial.”148
The Cronic Court further reasoned that the Sixth
Amendment would also be violated “if counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial
testing. . . .”149 The Cronic Court did not further define what would
constitute a meaningful lack of adversarial testing, nor did it present a
method of distinguishing such from mere litigation strategy.
On the evidence before the Court, the Cronic Court could not
determine if the tactics utilized at trial had rendered counsel
ineffective. Although skeptical that Cronic would prevail, the Court
nonetheless remanded the case for further evaluation by the circuit
court.150 The Court left open the possibility that a combination of
factors, including the limited trial preparation time, relative
inexperience of the attorney, and complexity of the case made it
possible that Cronic could successfully prove that he was deprived
effective assistance of counsel.151
As part of its instructions on remand, the Cronic Court noted that a
reversal was not warranted simply because an attorney is
inexperienced.152 The Cronic Court instead concluded that only in
extreme circumstances—where there has been a complete
miscarriage of justice—could prejudice be presumed.153
Although perhaps not present under the facts of Cronic, the
Court’s reasoning in Cronic left open the possibility that an attorney
might perform in a way that is so below-standard that it is akin to no
representation at all. If the attorney’s performance was that deficient,
automatic reversal would be required. Although the Cronic facts did
not rise to that level, the Cronic Court did not foreclose the
possibility of such a case arising under different facts. Accordingly,
no evaluation of prejudice is necessary in an attorney performance
case where the performance is so deficient that it is equivalent to no
representation at all.154
Although not applied with total uniformity, the reasoning of
Cronic has been applied to a variety of circumstances where
148. Id. at 659–60.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 666–67.
151. Id. at 666.
152. Id. at 665.
153. Id. at 658 fn 24; see e.g., Geders v. U.S., 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853 (1975); Brooks v. Tenn. 406 U.S. 605, 612-613 (1972); Hamilton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961);
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961);
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1945).
154. John Capone, Facilitating Fairness: The Judge’s Role in the Sixth Amendment Right to
Effective Counsel: Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 883–
84 (2003); Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Off the Beaten Path: An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Surprising
Decision in Mickens v. Taylor, 81 N.C.L. REV. 1268, 1270 (2003).
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prejudice “is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not
worth the cost.”155 The Cronic automatic reversal rule has been
applied where, due to a fee dispute with his client, an attorney failed
to attend a sentencing hearing.156 It has also been applied where the
attorney slept through, or was absent from, critical portions of his
client’s trial.157 At least according to the circuit courts, these attorney
performances were so below-standard as to require automatic
reversal.
Taken in tandem, Strickland and Cronic illustrated divergent ends
of a spectrum of attorney performance. The deficient performance
contemplated in Cronic was of an extremely rare type—so
ineffective that the attorney was all but absent. In such a case,
prejudice may be presumed, just as it may be presumed under the
Holloway rule. Strickland, however, was a more typical example of
an attorney performance that was adequate if not ideal. In such a
case, prejudice need be proven to a high standard in order for the
defendant to be granted a reversal of his conviction.
In its Strickland and Cronic decisions, the Court did not disturb its
conflict of interest jurisprudence. Instead, the Court articulated a
new, more stringent standard for reversal in attorney performance
cases. The stark difference between the Court’s conflict cases and
attorney performance cases illustrates that conflicts are very different
than other challenges facing attorneys. There is a spectrum of
deficient performances. A deficient performance must amount to a
near total denial of assistance for reversal to be warranted. Some
level of deficient performance, therefore, is permissible and does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Put more simply, some
degree of deficient performance is a problem that may be overcome.
In contrast, there does not appear to be a spectrum of conflicts. If a
conflict is present, it may present a constitutional violation. the
Holloway and Sullivan decisions implied that in many circumstances
a conflict of interest is a threat that, by its very nature, is unlikely to
be overcome.
After Strickland and Cronic were decided, the lower courts were
left with multiple tests and little guidance from the Court as to when
each test applied.158 Some circuits applied the Sullivan test only to

155. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
156. Abbamonte v. U.S., 7 Fed. Appx. 58, 57–59 (2d Cir. 2001).
157. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Olden v. U.S., 224
F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000); Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996).
158. Scott W. Street, Comment, Schwab v. Crosby: Interpreting the Scope of the Supreme Court’s
Tests for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Conflicts of Interest, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 651, 651–
52 (2008)
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concurrent joint representation cases.159 Some circuits applied the
Sullivan test to all ineffective assistance cases of any type.160 Most
circuits applied the Sullivan test to all conflict of interest challenges
and the Strickland test only to attorney performance challenges.161
This final group of circuits endorsed a view that conflicts of interest
pose more serious threats to the defendant than poor attorney
performance.
D. More Recently, in Mickens v. Taylor, the Court attempted to
reconcile its prior cases.

In 2002, twenty-two years after the Sullivan decision, the Court
considered the first non-attorney performance ineffective assistance
case since Sullivan. In Mickens v. Taylor, a sharply divided Court
held by a five-to-four majority that a trial court’s failure to inquire
into an unchallenged conflict of interest did not require automatic
reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Instead, the defendant had the
burden to prove that the conflict of interest adversely affected his
attorney’s performance.162
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia examined and attempted to
reconcile the holdings of Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood while reining
in the lower courts’ application of the Sullivan rule. 163 The Mickens
Court held that in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation
in the context of successive representation, the defendant must
demonstrate prejudice.164
In Mickens, defendant Mickens was accused of sodomizing and
stabbing seventeen-year-old Hall to death.165 Counsel was appointed
for Mickens by the trial court.166 Up until the day of his appointment

159. See, e.g., Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 797 (5th Cir. 2000); Caban v. U.S., 281 F.3d 778,
782 (8th Cir. 2002).
160. See, e.g., Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1451 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997).
161. See, e.g., Riggs v. U.S., 209 F.3d 828, 831 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865,
870 n.4 (8th Cir. 1999); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307–08 (2d Cir. 1993); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847
F.2d 576, 579–80 (9th Cir. 1988).
162. 535 U.S. 162, 173–74 (2002).
163. Id. at 165–76.
164. Id. at 166. Successive representation occurs when an attorney serially represents the interests
multiple two clients who are or may be adverse. The attorney does not simultaneously represent these
multiple clients. A common example of successive representation is when an attorney represents a wife
in a divorce proceeding and then represents her former husband in a custody case. By representing the
husband in the custody battle, the attorney represents a client whose interest may be opposed to his
former client, the wife. In contrast, if the attorney represented both the husband and wife, at the same
time, during the custody case the representation would be joint rather than successive.
165. Id. at 164.
166. Id.
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to represent Mickens, the court-appointed counsel had acted as
defense counsel for Hall in an unrelated criminal case.167 The same
trial court judge presided over the two cases and ordered the
appointment of counsel.168 Neither the trial court judge nor the
attorney ever disclosed to Mickens the prior representation of Hall or
the potential for a conflict of interest.169 Mickens first learned of his
attorney’s prior representation of Hall as a result of an inadvertent
post-trial court disclosure of docketing information.170 In this way,
the Mickens facts highlighted a key problem with the Sullivan
decision—often a defendant does not become aware of a conflict
before trial commences.
After exhausting his direct appeal, Mickens petitioned for a federal
writ of habeas corpus arguing, inter alia, that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s conflict of interest.171 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
applied the Sullivan test, requiring that Mickens show an actual
conflict of interest and an adverse effect.172 Although the district
court found that the judge was on notice and should have inquired
into the conflict, the district court nonetheless found that Mickens
failed to meet the Sullivan test.173
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court’s decision.174 On rehearing en banc, the Fourth
Circuit changed course and affirmed the conviction, following the
reasoning of the district court below.175 The Fourth Circuit held that
Mickens’s failure to meet the Sullivan test meant he was not entitled
to have his conviction overturned.176
The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court. In an opinion
authored by Justice Scalia, the Mickens majority suggested that a
conflict created by successive representation is a conflict that may be
overcome. The majority began by citing Strickland for the general
rule that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel had
an obligation to show prejudice.177
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
(en banc).
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 593 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Id. at 602–04.
Id. at 614–15.
Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 2000), rev’d 240 F. 3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001)
Taylor, 240 F.3d at 361–64.
Id. at 357-59.
Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166.
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The majority then noted an exception for cases “when the
defendant’s attorney actively represented conflicting interests.”178
Citing Holloway, the majority concluded that there was only a
requirement of automatic reversal where an attorney timely raises an
objection to a conflict of interest arising from joint concurrent
representation and is denied relief.179 In so holding, the Mickens
court limited Holloway and Sullivan even more strictly than they had
been interpreted. The Court also set a very high bar for a defendant
to establish that a conflict adversely affected the representation
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
The majority utilized Mickens to clarify the application of the
Sullivan test, noting that it has been wrongly applied by courts
below.180 The majority noted that the basis for application of the
Sullivan test was the Court’s belief that concurrent joint
representation creates a high probability of prejudice, a presumption
that the majority opined was not present in other types of conflicts.181
By suggesting that the Sullivan test be limited only to concurrent
joint representation cases, the Mickens Court called into question the
prior developed circuit court case law.182
Two justices concurred with the majority opinion. Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, filed a concurring opinion.183
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy addressed more directly
the specifics facts of the case as well as the trial court’s duty to
inquire into a potential conflict of interest.184
Four justices dissented from the majority opinion, filing three
separate opinions. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. In his
opinion, Justice Stevens considered various factors including whether
Mickens’s attorney had a duty to disclose his conflict, whether
Mickens had a right to refuse to be represented by conflicted counsel,
and whether the trial judge had a duty to obtain Mickens’s consent to
the representation.185 In light of the seriousness of the charges,
Justice Stevens opined that the trial court had an obligation to make
all inquiries into the attorney’s effectiveness.186 According to Justice
Stevens, where duties recognized by the criminal justice system have

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 166.
Id. at 168.
See id. at 174–75.
See id.
See id. at 174–75.
Id. 176–79.
Id. at 178–79. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 179–180 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 185–86.
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been violated, reversal should be mandatory.
Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion. In his opinion, Justice
Souter focused on the trial judge’s obligation to inquire into the
conflict of interest.187 He divided the Court’s prior cases into two
categories, those where there was a duty to inquire and those where
there was no duty.188 Given the trial court’s knowledge of the
attorney’s representation of both Mickens and Hall, Justice Souter
concluded that there had been a duty to inquire.189
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a dissenting
opinion. In that dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued in favor of
automatic reversal rule.190 Justice Breyer distinguished the facts of
Mickens from those of Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood.191 According
to Justice Breyer, because the conflict was egregious, occurred in a
capital murder case, and was created by the judge—the trial was
inherently tainted.192 According to Justice Breyer, a “categorical rule
that does not require proof of prejudice in the individual case” was
warranted.193
The wisdom of the Mickens decision has been questioned.194
Indeed, the sharp division of the court and multiple opinions suggest
varying methods of analyzing the facts of the case. A difference in
swing votes may have resulted in the Court announcing a different
rule. The Mickens rule that was announced, however, provided
additional context to the Glasser line of authority. Unlike Holloway
and Sullivan, Mickens did not involve concurrent joint representation
of multiple defendants. Rather, Mickens arose from a conflict of
interest created by successive representation.
Although there are differences between Mickens and its
predecessors, there are similarities as well. Mickens and Holloway
both involved attorney conflicts of interests. In Mickens, the conflict
was not one that created a per se conflict. In Holloway, the conflict
was one that created a per se conflict requiring no showing of
prejudice as grounds for reversal. Through its Mickens decision, the
Court seemingly endorsed the implicit reasoning underpinning its
prior decisions; namely, that some conflicts of interest are
unavoidable and more serious than other types of conflicts. Even

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 189 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 209, 211.
Id. at 209–11.
Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 211.
Glassman, supra note 30, at 965–66.
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after Mickens, however, there remained no clear categorization of
conflicts into those which are and are not avoidable.
Although decided in 2002, the Mickens decision was the Court’s
most recent case addressing the Court’s conflict of interest
jurisprudence. Since Mickens was decided, the Court has considered
only attorney performance cases under the Strickland standard,195
procedural issues,196 and the right to counsel more generally.197 The
Court has not revisited its jurisprudence on conflict of interests. For
more than a decade, the Mickens decision has been the Court’s final
word on ineffective assistance claims raised due to a conflict of
interest. It is ripe for the Court to revisit issues of attorney conflict of
interest, especially in light of the apparent proliferation of criminal
attorneys.
III. THE TRUE NATURE OF VARIOUS TYPES OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

As these cases illustrate, potential conflicts may take a variety of
forms, each with different associated risks to the defendant. Not
every form of conflict presents a direct conflict between the attorney
and his client.198 Although conflicts take a variety of forms, many
are positional in nature.199
A positional conflict occurs when an attorney advocates a position
that is directly contrary to the position taken on behalf of his client.200
Positional conflicts may arise when the attorney appears to represent
interests misaligned from the interests of his client. For example, an
attorney may teach classes to an agency and later defend individuals
accused of wrongdoing by that agency.201 It may appear from this
195. Hinton v. Ala., 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089–90 (2014); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013);
Chaidez v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107–08 (2013); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405–07 (2012);
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315–16 (U.S.
2012); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104–05
(2011); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121–23 (2011); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 389
(2010); Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 149 (2010); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38–40 (2009);
Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16–19 (2009); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123–28 (2009);
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–26 (2008); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380–81 (2005);
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 178–79 (2004); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2003); Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22–23 (2002); Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 697–99 (2002).
196. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917–18 (2013); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605,
621–22 (2005); Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 504–06 (2003).
197. U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144–49 (2006).
198. Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
199. R. David Donoghue, Conflict Of Interest: Conflicts of Interest: Concurrent Representation
11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 319, 320 (1998).
200. Jon S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 460 (1993).
201. U.S. v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37, 40–42 (1st Cir. 1991).
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representation that the attorney does not fully endorse the positions of
his client because the attorney aligns himself with the agency. An
attorney may be running for office and then feel some pressure to
appear to be “tough on crime.”202 The attorney may feel constrained
from adopting certain trial tactics which might later be scrutinized
during the attorney’s campaign.
Other conflicts are economic. Where an attorney is paid on a
contingency fee basis or is to receive a bonus contingent on acquittal,
there may be an incentive for the attorney to pressure his client to
reject a plea bargain.203 Similarly, where an attorney is paid not by
his client but rather by a third-party, there may be a conflict between
the best interests of the client and the third-party. For example, an
attorney paid to represent a client drug dealer by the drug supplier
may pressure the client to reject a plea bargain that would require
cooperation in the prosecution of the drug supplier.204
Not every conflict, however, is positional or economic. A conflict
can arise where outside forces distract the attorney from focusing on
his client. An attorney may be under investigation in an unrelated
matter and may feel an obligation to generally cooperate with the
government.205 The attorney may focus his time and energy on his
own defense, to the detriment of the client. An attorney who is
having an affair with his client’s spouse may develop a personal
conflict between fighting for his client’s acquittal and permitting the
client to be incarcerated.206 By doing so, the client would become
less of a competitor for the spouse’s affection.
Types of potential conflicts are too numerous to list. Each type of
conflict poses a different challenge to the attorney’s ability to
zealously advocate for his client. Given the variety of different
conflicts, it is important to develop reliable criteria for distinguishing
between different types of conflicts.
One method of evaluating conflicts in a particular situation is to
determine whether that conflict calls upon the attorney to temper his
defense of a client. In other words, analyzing whether the attorney
may be tempted to “pull his punches” because of other obligations to
clients, or due to the attorney’s personal interest.207
202. U.S. v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1418–21 (7th Cir. 1988).
203. Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1993).
204. Quintero v. U.S., 33 F.3d 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 1994).
205. U.S. v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 540–41 (2d Cir. 1989); Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463,
1479–80 (4th Cir. 1985).
206. U.S. v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 113032 (9th Cir. 1994).
207. Many of these situations are specifically addressed in ABA Model Rules. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013) (confidentiality of information; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.9 (duties to former clients); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (imputation of
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Regardless of the type of conflict, in the case of concurrent joint
representation or successive representation there is a genuine risk that
the attorney will temper his defense of a client due to the conflict.208
The attorney may be caught between two diametrically opposed
clients. The facts of Glasser illustrate the attorney’s connondrum;
the same evidence was both detrimental to defendant Glasser and
inculpatory to defendant Kretske. The attorney could not help both
of his clients equally. He had to preference either defendant Glasser
or defendant Kretske. Faced with clients who have divergent
interests, there is a genuine risk that the attorney will preference one
client over another. As the Court concluded in Holloway and
Sullivan, for this reason, concurrent joint representation can be
detrimental to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to unconflicted
counsel.
In important ways, successive representation of multiple
defendants differs from concurrent representation of multiple
defendants. Perhaps this distinction explains why the Mickens
decision was different than the Holloway and Sullivan decisions.
Successive representation arises due to prior relationships. In
successive representation, conflicts may arise if an two related cases
are litigated by the same attorney or if the attorney, in defense of one
client, discloses privileged communications from a different client.209
In cases of successive representation, the attorney’s representation of
one defendant will have terminated prior to representation of another
defendant.
The attorney no longer serves two masters
simultaneously; he serves two masters, one after another.
As a result, the likelihood of a conflict is decreased, although still
present. The facts of Mickens illustrate the potential for conflict. In
Mickens, the attorney may have gained information from his
representation of defendant Hall that suggested the sex was
consensual, rather than rape. That evidence would have been
exculpatory to defendant Mickens—but the evidence was learned
through the attorney’s representation of Hall. By disclosing that
information during Mickens’s trial, to benefit Mickens, the attorney
might have violated his duty of confidentiality to Hall. At the time
the disclosure would have occurred, the attorney’s representation of

conflicts of interest); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (special conflicts for government
officers and employees).
208. Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (citing Sullivan and noting that a conflict may
restrain an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but favorable to
another).
209. Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Hall would have been terminated.210 Hall would no longer have been
facing criminal charges and any disclosure could not have impacted
Hall’s own liberty interests. At least as to Hall, the attorney-client
relationship had terminated and the damage of disclosure was
tempered.
In contrast, in circumstances of concurrent representation, there are
simultaneous attorney-client relationships and representations. If an
attorney represents two co-conspirators, one guilty and one innocent,
the concurrent representation constrains the attorney from
exonerating the innocent client by placing all the blame on the guilty
client.211 The facts of Holloway and Sullivan illustrate well the
damage that may be caused by concurrent joint representation. Two
liberty interests may hang in the balance.
The potential conflict caused by simultaneously serving multiple
masters seems inherently riskier, and in many cases is ill-advised or
even prohibited.212 Successive representation is frequently permitted.
An attorney may be screened from a case so that others in his firm
can undertake successive representation.213 Screening, however, is
not generally permitted in the case of concurrent representation.214
Concurrent representation cases are most closely scrutinized than
successive representation cases.215 The temptation to divide loyalties
is simply ever-present.
An attorney with divided loyalties cannot be a fully effective
advocate.216 Indeed, reflecting this reality, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure treat concurrent and prior representations
differently, requiring more involvement by the trial court where there
is concurrent joint representation.217
Although successive
210. In addition, Hall was deceased. That may not be what occurs in other cases of successive
representation. A client who engages in consensual sex and discloses that fact to an attorney may later
object to this sex being disclosed publicly in unrelated litigation. This is especially true where, as in
Mickens, that sexual activity is stigmatized. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 163 (2002).
211. Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision
of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 690 (1992).
212. David M. Siegel, The Role of Trial Counsel In Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims:
Three Questions to Keep in Mind, 33 CHAMPION 14, 16 (2009).
213. See Donoghue, supra note 199, at 322–23.
214. Id.
215. Michael Edelman, Ethic: Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County: Attorney Withdrawal
from Concurrent Representations, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1379, 1382 (1995); Burkhart R. Lindahl,
Note, Ohio’s New Ethical Screening Procedure, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 148–49 (1999).
216. Patrice McGuire Sabach, Note, Rethinking Unwaivable Conflicts of Interest After United
States v. Schwarz and Mickens v. Taylor, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 92 (2003).
217. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c). In fact although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have a
specific rule for addressing concurrent representation, there are no other rules addressing other types of
conflicts. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175–76 (discussing the treatment of different conflicts by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
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representation may have risks, the risks are treated as though they are
less serious than those that may arise with concurrent representation.
Setting aside the timing of the representation, the specific nature of
the conflict is also relevant. Attorneys face a variety of conflict
scenarios where it is not unduly difficult to successfully balance
competing loyalties. Of the types of conflicts previously noted, the
following are not typically viewed as inherently threatening: the
attorney is paid on a contingent fee basis; the attorney may be called
to testify at trial; or the attorney represents both an employer and an
employee with diverging points of view.
The very cost of trial itself may create financial conflict.218 For
example, in Williams v. Calderon, a potential conflict was created
where a pro bono attorney had to pay for investigative and
psychiatric services with the attorney’s own funds.219 His client
argued that, as a result, the attorney might be tempted to skimp on
these services even though they might be beneficial to his client’s
defense.
Media attention may also cause a conflict between the attorney and
client.220 For example, in Ray v. Rose a conflict was created between
the attorney’s defense of his client and the fact that the attorney was
granted the right to sell his client’s life story.221 By discouraging a
plea and instead going to trial, the attorney might further
sensationalize the case such that the story would later become a more
valuable asset.222 Notwithstanding this potential for conflict, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deemed that the
attorney was able to balance his client’s interests fairly.223
A direct conflict between the interests of the client and the attorney
is more serious than those identified in Williams and Ray. Above all
else, attorneys must avoid conflicts of interest between themselves
and their clients. To avoid such a conflict, ethical rules prohibit
forms of attorney self-dealing, including:
(1) negotiating adverse business transactions; (2) self-dealing as
to gifts or testamentary bequests; (3) obtaining property interests

218. Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Themed Issue: Funding Justice: Justice Deserts: Spatial
Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 294-296 (2010); See, e.g.,
Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1992); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307–10
(2d Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980).
219. 52 F.3d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995).
220. Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 KAN. L.
REV. 43, 52 (Oct., 2009).
221. 535 F.2d 966, 968 (6th Cir. 1976).
222. Id. at 973.
223. Id. at 973–75.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/4

34

Finkelstein: Better Not Call Saul: The Impact of Criminal Attorneys on their

2015]

BETTER NOT CALL SAUL

1249

in client's literary or media rights; (4) subsidizing or obtaining a
proprietary interest in litigation; (5) receiving of unlawful
referral fees; and (6) negotiating prospective limitations on
malpractice claims.224
Even more dangerous than these forms of self-dealing are those
situations where the attorney covertly pursues personal goals to the
client’s detriment.
A distracted attorney, more concerned with his own wrongdoing
than defending his client, might pursue personal goals to his client’s
detriment. Where the attorney is at risk of being indicted in an
unrelated matter than one involving his client, there is a risk that the
defense of the client may suffer as a result.225 The attorney may
simply lose focus on his client’s case.
Even worse, the attorney may seek to curry favor with prosecutors
by sacrificing his client or may prolong his client’s case. For
example, in United States v. McClain, an attorney learned during trial
that he was under investigation by the same prosecutors against
whom he was defending his client.226 The prosecutor and attorney
discussed delaying the indictment of the attorney until after the
conclusion of the client’s trial.227 After the client was convicted, the
attorney was indicted for unrelated charges.228 The attorney had a
clear incentive to delay his client’s trial so the attorney had additional
time to prepare his own defense against the pending charges. In
evaluating these circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit found a conflict sufficient to meet the
Sullivan standard for reversal.229
As these cases and hypotheticals illustrate, if an attorney
simultaneously serves two masters, he may be forced to choose
between competing interests to the detriment of the client. The
conflict may, in many cases, be difficult or impossible to avoid. The
competent lawyer is one who zealously advocates for the client, and
prioritizes the client’s interest above all others. As the Supreme
Court has noted “[u]ndivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service

224. Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility and a Transformative
Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 809, 828–29 (2000).
225. See, c.f., Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no conflict where
the attorney was indicted and pled guilty to charges unrelated to his representation of his client);
Commonwealth v. McCloy, 574 A.2d 86, 91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (finding no conflict where the
attorney was the target of a bribery investigation while defending his client on unrelated drug charges).
226. 823 F.2d 1457, 1463 (11th Cir. 1987).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1463–64.
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to a client are prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind
of service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision.”230 The
attorney’s duty of loyalty to his client is, therefore, fundamental. If
the attorney does not observe his client’s best interests, no one else
will. The client’s other substantive rights may be deprived with no
one to defend him.
As the Supreme Court has noted, it is precisely this type of
conflict, between an attorney and his client, where the adversarial
process may be jeapardized.231 It also reflects poorly on the judicial
system and creates the appearance of unfairness to the public. It does
not cause an untoward degree of improperity for the public to learn
that some attorneys are more competent than others. There is
significant impropriety in the public learning that an attorney
breached his duty of loyalty to a client. In the area of ineffective
assistance, public perception is paramount.232
For this reason, in United States v. Ellison, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a conflict required
reversal where an attorney, defending himself against malpractice,
testified against his client.233 Noting that the attorney was “not able
to pursue his client’s best interests free from the influence of his
concern about possible self-incrimination,” the court held that the
attorney had breached the most basic of his duties: the duty of loyalty
to his client.234
For the same reason, the conflict caused by an attorney who
conspired with his client is equally unavoidable. The conflict caused
by dual competing interests is even more serious where the attorney
and client are co-conspirators. In such a case, the attorney may find
his interests pitted directly against his client’s interests. He still
serves two masters, himself and his client.
An attorney whose own self-interests are interjected into his
client’s case is different than a merely incompetent attorney. In
situations where the attorney has himself been indicted or is under
investigation, the attorney has a self-serving bias in favor of
protecting his own liberty interests.235 Even litigation decisions that
230. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725–26 (1948).
231. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 586–87 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
232. Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the Court: Trial Court Responsibility for
Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
425, 442–43 (2004); David Rossman, Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure: Alice in Wonderland
Meets the Constitution, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 417, 457 (2010).
233. 798 F.2d 1102, 1106–09 (7th Cir. 1986).
234. Id. at 1107.
235. U.S. v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 157 (2d Cir. 1994).
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appear to be legitimate may seemingly be motivated by conflict.236
Even worse, the attorney’s decisions may actually be motivated by
the conflict. The self-interested attorney may make conscious
decisions to preference his own cause above his client’s, and may do
so in a savvy manner which covers any evidence of the decisions.
The consequences to the attorney are also more significant than
mere financial considerations; his very life and liberty may be at
stake.237 As one court noted, prejudice is highly probable:
First, when an attorney is the subject of a criminal investigation
by the same prosecutor who is prosecuting the attorney’s client,
there is a high probability of prejudice to the client as the result
of the attorney’s obvious self-serving bias in protecting his own
liberty interests and financial interests. The liberty concern at
issue is avoiding or minimizing imprisonment. The financial
interests include avoiding disbarment and avoiding termination
of the attorney’s current representation of the client in question.
The high probability of prejudice in this situation distinguishes
this personal interest conflict from the weaker personal interest
conflicts listed in the dicta in Mickens, e.g., book deals. Second,
such prejudice is difficult to prove because the client could be
harmed by the attorney’s actions or inactions that are known
only to the attorney. In short, the personal interest conflict at
issue presents comparable difficulties to situations involving
concurrent representation conflicts.238
The risks posed by a criminal attorney, therefore, are unique and far
more concerning than the risks associated with more mundane
conflicts.
In the case of the criminal attorney, the attorney “cannot be wholly
free from fear of what might happen if a vigorous defense should
lead the prosecutor or the trial judge to inquire into his background
and discover his [own criminal conduct].”239 At every step in the
litigation, the attorney puts himself in a position where his own
interests are adverse to the vigorous defense his client. As the
Second Circuit has suggested, nothing could be more of a conflict
than “a concern over getting oneself into trouble with criminal law
enforcement authorities.”240
The attorney faces a temptation to make litigation choices that will
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

U.S. v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132,135 (3d Cir. 1979).
Poulin, supra note 40, at 1162–63.
Rugiero v. U.S., 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 906 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citations omitted).
U.S. v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 869 (2nd Cir. 1984).
Id. at 870.
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increase the chances that the attorney’s own wrongdoing will remain
undiscovered. If calling his client to testify might exonerate the
client but implicate the attorney, the attorney may find it impossible
to preference the client’s interest over his own. The attorney maybe
constrained in a way that jeapardizes the entire justice sustem. As
one court noted:
If there is any constraint on counsel’s complete and exuberant
presentation, our system will fail because the basic ingredient of
the adversary system will be missing. The essence of the
system is that there be professional antagonists in the legal
forum, dynamic disputants prepared to do combat for the
purpose of aiding the court in its quest to do justice.241
If a truly unavaoidable conflict exists under any facts, it is where an
attorney co-conspirator represents his client. If an automatic reversal
rule is appopriate in any case, it should be applied to an attorney coconspirator’s defense of his client.
In its decisions, the Supreme Court has justified its lower threshold
to show prejudice for conflict of interest cases by observing that it is
“difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of
representation
corrupted
by
conflicting
interests.”242
Notwithstanding this fact, the Court rejected a strict rule of
disqualification primarily because the Court assumed that an attorney
is “fully conscious of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his
or her client.”243 An attorney who participates in a criminal scheme
with his client, in contrast, may not be so focused on the overarching
duties of the profession.
Moreover, cases involving conflicts of interest present a unique
challenge to a defendant arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.
The client must both identify a deficiency in his counsel’s
performance and link that deficiency to a specific action in the
case.244 As the Holloway Court noted, the harm stemming from a
conflict of interest is often that the conflict causes a lawyer to refrain
from taking action, rather than that the conflict causes the attorney to
make an obvious error. The trial court record does not necessarily
patently reveal decisions that were not made. An attorney laboring
under a conflict may, due to that conflict, fail to aggressively puruse
241. U.S. v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1979).
242. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
243. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987).
244. Recent Cases: Criminal Law. Conflicts of Interest-First Circuit Rules that a Defendant
Whose Lawyer had a Conflict that the Judge Should Have Known About Must Show Adverse Effect to
Receive a New Trial, 115 HARV. L. REV. 938, 944 (2002).
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possible plea negotiations for his client. Such a failure would not be
evident from the trial court record.
Requiring a criminal defendant to demonstrate prejudice in the
case of a criminal attorney would be unnecessary.245 As discussed
herein, the very nature of the conflict makes effective representation
impossible. Such a requirement would also unfairly shift the burden
to the defendant to prove what may be true but unproveable—that his
trial attorney made self-interested decisions and did not have his
client’s sole interest in mind. The defendant would be forced to
prove, post hoc, his attorney’s state of mind and thought process.
Such a showing may, in many cases, be impossible for the defendant
to make.246 Unlike the defendant whose attorney’s incompetence
can be derived from the record, the defendant represented by a
criminal attorney may be wholly unable to make a case for reversal
from the record.
In at least some cases, the only person with a full understanding
about the very decisions at issue would be the attorney himself. The
client may be unaware that the attorney’s conduct may cause the
attorney to become an informant and sacrifice the client in an effort
to procure a more lenient sentence for himself. The client,
uneducated in the law and perhaps unaware of the full scope of his
attorney’s conduct, may simply fail to appreciate the risks posed by
the representation.
The client also cannot prove what his attorney contemplated but
failed to do. The client may not be able to prove that a choice at trial
was strategic, self interested, or merely an oversight. The ability of a
defendant to prove ineffective assistance would often depend
exclusively on the attorney’s testimony. Yet it seems unlikely that an
attorney accused of ineffective assistance of counsel can be relied
upon to testify truthfully in post-conviction proceedings. Empirical
evidence suggests that trial counsel are reluctant to assist in
subsequent ineffective assistance claims.247 As one commentator has

245. It may also be unrealistic, given that the client may initially be tacit in accepting the conflict
posed by the representation. The client may not initially recognize the risks inherent in such
representation, and may only later discover or realize that his interests were subjugated to the attorney’s
own self-interest. In addition, unless the client is himself a lawyer the client may be unaware of the
ethical obligations arising from the representation. The attorney, who is a voluntary member of the
profession and subject to rules of professional conduct is aware.
246. This highlights the inherent challenge facing a defendant who must meet the Strickland or
Sullivan test.
247. See Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003) (noting that “[a]ppellate counsel often need
trial counsel’s assistance in becoming familiar with a lengthy record on a short deadline, but trial
counsel will be unwilling to help appellate counsel familiarize himself with a record for the purpose of
understanding how it reflects trial counsel’s own incompetence.”).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015

39

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 4

1254

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

noted, “there is a direct clash between duty and self-interest.”248
Self-interest is likely to prevail.249
This problem is heightened in the case of a criminal attorney. Not
only will the attorney’s testimony be vital to the defendant’s ability
to prove ineffective assistance, but the attorney will have an added
incentive not to testify truthfully. Not only could such testimony
impugne the attorney’s legal skills in defending the client, the
testimony could further reveal the attorney’s wrongdoing. In cases of
a criminal attorney, the attorney is a person whose conduct is alleged
to have been ineffective. Testifying to assist the client may focus the
prosecution instead upon the attorney.
Additionally, the criminal attorney is not your garden variety
individual who can be trusted to exercise good judgment. The
criminal attorney is an individual who has violated ethics rules,
broken the law, and exercised poor judgment by engaging in criminal
activity. He is also an individual who stands much to gain from
preventing the disclosure of that criminal activity. In contrast, there
is little to gain from truthful testimony. The attorney whose conduct
was criminal and who now faces exposure can be expected to resist
any effort to allow the conflict to be fully revealed.
The potential harm to the client is readily apparent. It is possible
that getting his client to accept a plea deal to lesser charges may
result in the criminal attorney evading conviction or receiving a
lesser sentence. This is especially true where the criminal attorney is
accused of a conspiracy charge. In such a case, if the client pleas to a
misdemeanor rather than a felony, the criminal attorney may now be
less likely to face conspiracy charges with the underlying crime being
labeled a felony.
Alternatively, the criminal attorney may curry favor with
prosecutors by allowing his client to be tried and convicted. The
criminal attorney may also have an incentive to lie or to withhold
evidence that is exculpatory to the defendant but inculpatory to the
criminal attorney. Anything that reveals the criminal attorney had an
involvement in the crime may be inculpatory to him.
As this discussion highlights, different conflicts effect the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in different ways. The Supreme Court
has decided, through its jurispridence, that most Sixth Amendment
ineffectiveness cases require that the defendant show that his
248. Eldred, supra note 220, at 75.
249. See Lawrence Kornreich & Alexander I. Platt, In this Issue: The Temptation of Martinez v.
Ryan: Legal Ethics for the Habeas Bar, 8 CRIM. L. BRIEF 1, 2 (2012); Ellen Henak, When the Interests
of Self Clients, and Colleagues Collide: The Ethics of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 369–70 (2009).
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attorney’s errors fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and prejudiced the case.250 Where certain types conflicts are present,
however, prejudice may be presumed because the conflict so
dangerously pits the defendant’s interest against other competing
interests.251 The Supreme Court has, through its Holloway and
Sullivan decisions, determined that concurrent joint representation
can be one such circumstance.
The criminal attorney, torn between protecting himself and his
client, presents another. When a criminal attorney acts as defense
counsel, a rule requiring reversal with no need to show prejudice, is
equally appropriate. As noted herein, the concept of an automatic
reversal rule is not absent from the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court
has suggested that an automatic reversal rule applies to claims with
“circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the
cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”252
The criminal attorney should be numbered among these
circumstances.
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT REQUIRES AUTOMATIC REVERSAL IN
CRIMINAL ATTORNEY CASES

The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case where an ineffective
assistance claim was predicated upon the conflict caused by an
attorney co-conspirator or criminal attorney. The Court, therefore,
has never endorsed the application of an automatic reversal rule to
this type of conflict. Indeed, the Court has never applied an
automatic reversal rule in a conflict case outside the context of
concurrent joint representation of co-defendants.253
A majority of lower courts have similarly declined to extend the
Holloway automatic reversal rule. Courts have generally limited the
rule to conflicts raised by the concurrent joint representation of codefendants in all but one circuit where the issue has been decided.254
In most circuits, even in the context of an attorney who represents a

250. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–88, 694 (1984).
251. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
252. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
253. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783
(1987); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176 (1986).
254. See, e.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 777 (6th Cir. 2013); McCorkle v. U.S., 325 F.
App’x. 804, 808 (11th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Watson, 479 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. MotaSantana, 391 F.3d 42, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Wallace, 276 F.3d 360, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2002);
Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1472–73 (9th Cir. 1995); Beets v. Collins, 65 F.3d 1258, 1268–69
(5th Cir. 1995).
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co-conspirator client, the Sullivan test applies.255 Only the Second
Circuit has uniformly extended the automatic reversal rule in conflict
cases other than those involving concurrent joint representation.256
The Second Circuit acknowledges that certain conflicts of interest
have the potential to be “so severe that [it is] deemed per se
[violative] of the Sixth Amendment.”257 Where such conflict is
present, reversal is automatic with no requirement that prejudice be
shown.258 Courts in the Second Circuit apply an automatic reversal
rule in two types of cases: first, in cases where an attorney was
unlicensed in any jurisdiction at the time of representation;259 and
second, in cases where the attorney is implicated in the defendant’s
crimes.260 That latter circumstance is deemed a conflict of interest
too significant for a defendant to waive.261
As discussed herein, there are valid reasons for the Second Circuit
to single out the latter circumstance as one subject to an automatic
reversal rule. The Second Circuit has concluded that an attorney who
has himself conspired in the crimes of his client simply cannot
provide effective assistance of counsel. As the Second Circuit has
noted, an attorney who has engaged in a crime “cannot be wholly
free from fear of what might happen if a vigorous defense should
lead the prosecutor or the trial judge to inquire into his background . .
. Yet a criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by someone
free from such constraints.”262 As such, in the Second Circuit, there
is no need to show prejudice where an attorney labored under a
conflict of interest due to the attorney’s own criminal activity with or
on behalf of his client.
255. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mikell, 344 Fed. Appx. 218, 227–29 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying the Sullivan
test where the prosecutor alleged that defense counsel con-conspired with his client); Mannhalt v. Reed
847 F.2d 576, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting habeas corpus relief where a client’s attorney inserted
himself into the trial as a witness); see also U.S. v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1983)
(disqualifying an attorney who was an indicted co-conspirator with his client).
256. Although other circuits have declined to adopt additional extensions of the per se rule, courts
routinely hold that an attorney co-conspirator meets the Sullivan test and has an actual conflict of
interest. See, e.g., Perillo v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1996); Mannhalt, 847 F.2d at 581–84;
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3d Cir. 1984).
257. U.S. v. Williams, 372 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d
Cir. 1983).
258. U.S. v. John Doe No. 1, 272 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2001).
259. See, e.g., U.S. v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 890 (2d Cir. 1990); Solina v. U.S., 709 F.2d 160, 167
(2d Cir. 1983).
260. See, e.g., Cancilla, 725 F.2d at 870. Where the attorney is implicated in unrelated criminal
conduct, the Second Circuit does not apply the per se rule. See U.S. v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 157 n.8 (2d
Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528, 531 (2d Cir. 1990); Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375,
383 (2d Cir. 1988).
261. Williams, 372 F.3d at 102–03; see U.S. v. Kliti, 156 F.3d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
262. Solina, 709 F.2d at 164.
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The Second Circuit has applied this rule in several cases where an
attorney was implicated in his client’s crimes.263 For example, in
United States v. Fulton, the court held that there was a per se conflict
where the attorney and client together conspired to import and
distribute heroin.264
During the trial in Fulton, a witness for the prosecution implicated
defendant Fulton’s lead attorney in the same crime.265 Defendant
Fulton was informed of the potential conflict but nonetheless elected
to proceed with his lead attorney.266 Fulton was convicted.267 He
then appealed. 268
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the conviction holding that the conflict was a nonwaiveable, per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. The court
reasoned that the attorney’s “fear of, and desire to avoid, criminal
charges . . . will affect virtually every aspect of his or her
representation of the defendant” such that no waiver could be
permissible.269 As the Second Circuit explained, any circumstance
wherein “the attorney’s own interests diverge from those of the client
presents the same core problem presented in the multiple
representation cases:
the attorney’s fealty to the client is
compromised.”270
The Second Circuit has held that the conflict may be present even
when the attorney has not yet been accused or indicted.271 In United
States v. Cancilla, the attorney and his client were both involved in
an insurance fraud scheme.272 Defendant Cancilla and his wife
would insure automobiles that had already been damaged and then
submit claims for accidents that never occurred.273 Although it was
not fully revealed until after Cancilla was convicted, his attorney had
a prior relationship with the automobile repair shop involved in the
scheme.274 In fact, the attorney submitted false insurance claims for

263. See U.S. v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1993) ; Triana v. U.S., 205 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir.
2000).
264. Fulton, 5 F.3d at 611–12.
265. Id. at 607.
266. Id. at 608.
267. Id. at 606.
268. Id. at 607.
269. Id. at 613.
270. Id. at 609.
271. Under Second Circuit law the issue of how much involvement the attorney must have in his
client’s crime or how likely it is that the attorney will be indicted, tried, or convicted remains unsettled.
272. 725 F.2d 867, 868 (2d Cir. 1984).
273. Id.
274. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015

43

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 4

1258

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

his own vehicles.275
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that defendant Cancilla did not need to prove prejudice
under the Sullivan test.276 Instead, reversal of Cancilla’s conviction
was automatic. In so holding, the court noted the severity of the
conflict—any “wrong step” by the attorney could have drawn
unwarranted attention to the attorney.277 The court reasoned that this
fear of attention and detection may have caused the attorney to keep a
low profile, even if that resulted in a subpar defense of his client. In
the Second Circuit, an attorney who represents his co-conspirator
client is grounds for the Holloway automatic reversal rule, not the
Sullivan actual prejudice test.
Most circuits do not so hold.278 Although the Second Circuit’s
extension of the Holloway automatic reversal rule is a minority view,
there is wisdom to this approach. When an attorney is, or is likely to
be, the subject of a criminal investigation, there is a significant
temptation by the attorney to preference his own self-interest. The
attorney’s fear that evidence of his involvement will be disclosed
could permeate every aspect of his client’s defense. From discovery
to plea deals, at every stage of litigation the attorney is likely to be
overwhelmed by protecting himself even if it means sacrificing his
client. The seriousness of this type of conflict is difficult to ignore.
When an attorney has conspired with his client, the resulting conflict
creates precisely the type of unavoidable, un-waivable conflict that
justifies automatic reversal.
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PER SE REVERSAL RULE IS JUSTIFIED IN THE
CASE OF ATTORNEYS WHO REPRESENT THEIR CO-CONSPIRATOR
CLIENTS

Perhaps as a nod to the Second Circuit, the Mickens Court
cautioned in dicta that some circuits might be applying too lenient a
standard in different types of conflict of interest situations. At least
in the area of attorney co-conspirators, there are valid reasons for a
lenient standard to apply. The Mickens decision can be read to
suggest that only conflicts arising from concurrent joint
representation of co-defendants should be subject to a lenient
standard. Under such a reading, other conflicts, including those
275. Id.
276. Id. at 870–71.
277. Id. at 871.
278. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mikell, 344 Fed. Appx. 218, 229 (6th Cir. 2009); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847
F.2d 576, 579–80 (9th Cir. 1988).
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arising from attorney co-conspirators should be subject to the rules of
Strickland or Sullivan. By applying this standard, reversal would be
granted only where there is a showing of “but for” causation or actual
prejudice. The most detrimental of all possible conflicts would be
subject to one of the two the most rigorous standards. Accordingly,
many defendants would fail to meet this burden.
As posited herein, there can be no greater interest than selfpresentation. In the case of the criminal attorney, this interest is
pitted squarely against the interest of the client. Due to the unusual
severity of this conflict, cases of this type should not be subject to the
ineffective assistance of counsel tests in Stickland or Sullivan. These
cases should be subject to automatic reversal, as occurs in the Second
Circuit. When an attorney is implicated in the same criminal
enterprise as the client he defendants, there should be no possibility
of waiver by the client. Nor should it matter whether the trial court
had reason to inquire into the conflict. When it is subsequently
discovered that the client was represented by an attorney involved in
his or her criminal conduct, the client should be granted reversal and
a new trial without any need to show an adverse effect on
representation.
At least in the realm of fiction, the criminal attorney endures. In
2013, the AMC series Breaking Bad ended.279 It was almost
immediately announced that a spin-off series would air in February,
2015.280 This new series, entitlted “Better Call Saul” will focus on
criminal attorney Saul Goodman.281
As the popularity of Breaking Bad reveals, the concept of the
criminal attorney captivates and entertains. As argued herein,
however, although the concept of the criminal attorney may seem
like the exclusive province of screenwriters, there are real attorneys
conspiring with their clients. When a client is indicted and tried, and
his attorney co-conspirator acts as defense counsel, there are
significant constutional law implications that should not be ignored.
Although no case involving a criminal attorney has yet reached the
Court, there may come a time when a writ of ceriorari is granted in
such a case. When such a case presents itself, the Court will have an
opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard for this unique type of
conflict. The Court may elect, as many lower courts have elected, to
apply either the Sullivan “actual conflict” test or the Strickland “but
for” causation test.
For the reasons discussed herein, such
279. See J. Hoberman, On the Road, and on the Run, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2014, at 16.
280. Hank Stuever, ‘Peter Pan’ storms NBC with Christopher Walken as Hook; ‘Comeback’ is
coming . . . back, WASH. POST, July 15, 2014, at C02.
281. Id.
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application would apply too lenient a standard to a very serious
conflict of interest. Cases of a criminal attorney are more akin to the
conflicts requiring automatic reversal in Holloway and Wood. An
automatic reversal rule for attorney co-conspirators, like the one
utilized in the Second Circuit, is more apt.
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